Estimating regime-switching Taylor rules with trend inflation by Castelnuovo, Efrem et al.
Efrem Castelnuovo – Luciano Greco – Davide Raggi
Estimating regime-switching Taylor 
rules with trend inﬂ  ation
Bank of Finland Research
Discussion Papers















































Bank of Finland 
PO Box 160 
FI-00101 HELSINKI 
Finland 




    
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 
20 • 2008 
   Efrem Castelnuovo* – Luciano Greco** – Davide Raggi*** 
   Estimating regime-switching 
Taylor rules with trend inflation 
    The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland. 
 
*  University of Padua and Bank of Finland. E-mail: 
efrem.castelnuovo@unipd.it. Corresponding author. 
**  University of Padua. E-mail: luciano.greco@unipd.it. 
***  University of Bologna. E-mail: davide.raggi@unibo.it. 
 
We would like to thank Guido Ascari, Francesco Bianchi, 
Patrick Crowley, Esa Jokivuolle, David Mayes, Jouko 
Vilmunen, Paolo Zagaglia and participants at seminars and 
conferences at the University of Padua, the CEF 2008 (Paris), 






























































Estimating regime-switching Taylor rules with trend 
inflation 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 20/2008 
Efrem Castelnuovo – Luciano Greco – Davide Raggi 




This paper estimates regime-switching monetary policy rules featuring trend 
inflation using post-WWII US data. We find evidence in favour of regime shifts 
and time-variation of the inflation target. We also find a drop in the inflation gap 
persistence when entering the Great Moderation sample. Estimated Taylor rule 
parameters and regimes are robust across different monetary policy models. We 
propose an ‘internal consistency’ test to discriminate among our estimated rules. 
Such a test relies upon a feedback mechanism running from the monetary policy 
stance to the inflation gap. Our results support the stochastic autoregressive 
process as the most consistent model for trend inflation, above all when 
conditioning to the post-1985 subsample. 
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Ajoittain muuttuva inflaatiotavoite ja vaihtuviin 
rahapolitiikan järjestelmiin mukautuvien 
korkosääntöjen tilastollinen analyysi 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 20/2008 
Efrem Castelnuovo – Luciano Creco – Davide Raggi 




Tässä tutkimuksessa estimoidaan Yhdysvaltain toisen maailmansodan jälkeistä 
aikasarja-aineistoa hyväksi käyttäen rahapolitiikan ohjaussääntöä kuvaava regii-
minvaihdosmalli. Mallissa on lisäksi otettu huomioon keskuspankin mahdollisesti 
ajoittain muuttuva inflaatiotavoite. Mallin taloudellisen logiikan mukaan keskus-
pankin käyttämä ohjaussääntö – tässä tapauksessa korkosääntö – mukautuu raha-
politiikan järjestelmän muutoksiin. Näihin järjestelmämuutoksiin liittyen tai nii-
den lisäksi keskuspankki mahdollisesti ajoittain muuttaa inflaatiotavoitettaan. 
Yhdysvaltain rahapolitiikan järjestelmässä ja menettelytavoissa on estimointi-
tulosten mukaan toteutettu toisen maailmansodan jälkeen muutoksia. Tulokset 
viittaavat myös siihen, että näiden muutosten lisäksi maan keskuspankin inflaatio-
tavoitetta on ajoittain muutettu. Kun estimoinnit rajoitetaan inflaation ns. suuren 
hidastumisen (”Great Moderation”) eli 1980-luvun alun jälkeiseen ajanjaksoon, 
tulokset viittaavat niin ikään siihen, että mitatun inflaation poikkeamat keskus-
pankin inflaatiotavoitteesta ovat aikaisempiin vuosikymmeniin nähden lyhyt-
kestoisempia. Rahapolitiikan regiimit ja korkosäännön parametrit eivät havaitta-
vasti muutu, kun estimoinneissa käytetään vaihtoehtoisia rahapolitiikan malli-
täsmennyksiä. Tutkimuksessa esitetään rakenteellinen konsistenssitesti, jonka 
avulla eri korkosääntöjen mielekkyys toimivan rahapolitiikan kannalta voidaan 
tarkistaa. Työssä argumentoidaan, että rahapolitiikasta on takaisinkytkentä toteu-
tuneeseen inflaatioon, jonka seurauksena inflaatio korreloi negatiivisesti reaali-
koron kanssa. Ajoittain muuttuvien ja korreloituneiden inflaatiotavoitteiden malli 
on työn tulosten mukaan parhaiten sopusoinnussa toteutuneen inflaation pitkän 
aikavälin vaihteluiden kanssa erityisesti, kun tarkastelujaksoa rajoitetaan vuoden 
1985 jälkeiseen aikaan. 
 
Avainsanat: aktiivinen ja passiivinen Taylor-sääntö, inflaatiotavoite, inflaatio-
poikkeamien pitkäikäisyys, markovilaiset tilojen muutosmallit 
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Macroeconomists often employ the Taylor (1993) rule to model monetary
policymakers’ conduct. In its original version, the Taylor rule postulates the
systematic, stable reaction of a short term interest rate — assumed to be directly
controlled by the Fed — to deviations of inﬂation with respect to a constant
inﬂation target and to business cycle ﬂuctuations. Taylor (1993) shows that a
calibrated version of the rule ﬁts remarkably well the US facts for the period
1987—1992.
Both parameter and inﬂation target stability have been recently challenged
by the empirical literature. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004), Cogley and Sargent (2005a), Kim and Nelson (2006),
Boivin (2006), Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Benati and Surico (2008a)
document the signiﬁcant instability of the Fed’s reaction to inﬂation over the
last 50 years, with evidence in favor of a switch to a more aggressive monetary
conduct occurring at the beginning of the ’80s. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004),
Boivin and Giannoni (2006), Lubik and Surico (2006), and Benati and Surico
(2008b) show that such a policy shift, when coupled with a new-Keynesian
framework, is able to deliver the Great Moderation.1 As regards the inﬂation
target, Ireland (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2005), Cogley and Sbordone
(2007), Bjørnland, Leitemo, and Maih (2007), Stock and Watson (2007), Leigh
(2008) and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2008) provide evidence in favor
of a slowly evolving latent monetary policy objective, ie time-varying ‘trend
inﬂation’.2 Interestingly, trend inﬂation turns out to be important in modeling
inﬂation with a new-Keynesian Phillips curve. Cogley and Sbordone (2005),
Cogley and Sbordone (2007), and Bjørnland, Leitemo, and Maih (2007) show
that, when accounting for trend inﬂation in the derivation of the supply curve,
the empirical relevance of the ad-hoc price indexation ingredient collapses to
zero. In other words, trend inﬂation turns out be important for delivering a
theoretically more satisfactory model for inﬂation.3
Unfortunately, empirical investigations on policy rules conducted so far
have considered either sources of misspeciﬁcation. Indeed, both parameter
instability and trend inﬂation are sources of potentially severe misspeciﬁcation
1The term ‘Great Moderation’ is usually employed to indicate the generalized reduction in
output and inﬂation volatility observed since the mid-’80s in the US and other industrialized
countries (Kim and Nelson, 1999; McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; and Blanchard and
Simon, 2001). It must be acknowledged that the ‘good monetary policy’ view is not
uncontented. For contributions supporting the role of more benign macroeconomic shocks as
the main driver of the Great Moderation, see Sims and Zha (2006), Justiano and Primiceri
(2008), Canova, Gambetti, and Pappa (2007), Canova, Gambetti, and Pappa (2008). For
some counter-arguments, see Benati and Surico (2008b) and Giannone, Reichlin, and Lenza
(2008).
2Ascari (2004) coined the term ‘trend inﬂation’ to indicate a strictly positive level
of steady state inﬂation around which to approximate ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order condition in the
derivation of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve. The literature has recently considered the
c a s eo fat i m e - v a r y i n gi n ﬂation target. We will use the terms ‘time-varying trend inﬂation’
and ‘trend-inﬂation’ interchangeably.
3Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) empirically investigate the impact that shifts in the private
sector’s perceptions over the time-varying inﬂation target may have on the transmission
going from structural shocks to inﬂation, output, and interest rates.
7for the estimation of objects of interest such as policy parameters, policy
targets, dating of the switch from a regime to another, measures of gaps
such as the inﬂation gap — the diﬀerence between realized inﬂation and its
contemporaneous target — and the real interest rate gap — the wedge between
the real interest rate and its steady-state value, and their interrelationships.
One is then left to wonder how these objects look like when parameter
instability and trend inﬂation are jointly accounted for.
This paper employes Bayesian techniques to estimate regime-switching
Taylor rules featuring time-varying policy targets. First, we estimate a
regime-switching rule under the assumption of ﬁxed inﬂation target so to set
up a reference scenario. Then, we propose two alternative policy rules, one
featuring a non-stochastic time-varying inﬂation target computed with the
widely employed Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, and the other one characterized by a
stochastic autoregressive model for trend inﬂation as in Ireland (2007), Cogley
and Sbordone (2005), Cogley and Sbordone (2007), Bjørnland, Leitemo, and
Maih (2007), Stock and Watson (2007), Leigh (2008) and Cogley, Primiceri,
and Sargent (2008). The former alternative model is studied to understand
if a ‘quick-ﬁx’ measure of trend inﬂation may deliver an estimated Taylor
rule displaying interesting properties when compared to the latter framework,
which encompasses the ﬁxed-inﬂation target proposal.
O u rm a i nr e s u l t sr e a da sf o l l o w s . I nl i n ew i t hp r e v i o u sc o n t r i b u t i o n s ,w e
ﬁnd evidence in favor of monetary policy regime-switches and time-variation of
the estimated inﬂation target in the post-WWII era.4 Our three policy rules —
again, the rule with a ﬁxed inﬂation target, the rule with the Hodrick-Prescott
inﬂation trend as time-varying inﬂation objective, and the one with a stochastic
autoregressive process to model the evolving target — feature quite diﬀerent
inﬂation gaps but very similar estimated parameters as well as associated
policy regimes. Importantly enough, inﬂa t i o ng a p st u r no u tt ob ei n f o r m a t i v e
to discriminate among policy rules on the basis of an ‘internal consistency’
test. Taylor rules sensibly describe policymakers’ conduct if a feedback
relationship going from monetary policy interventions — that inﬂuence the
real interest rate gap — to the inﬂation gap is established. In particular,
policy tightenings/loosenings should induce downward/upward movements
of the inﬂation gap, possibly with some lags. Then, we should observe a
negative correlation between the real interest rate gap and the inﬂation gap.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the only model supporting this ‘reverse causality’
among the ones at hand is that allowing for the stochastic autoregressive
representation of the time-varying inﬂation target. Our results support the
employment of stochastic processes for trend inﬂation in monetary policy
frameworks.
The structure of the paper reads as follows. The next Section presents
the regime-switching models we estimate, and shortly discusses the algorithm
we employ to estimate them. Section 3 discusses our empirical results by
highlighting similarities and diﬀerences that concern the estimated models at
4We abstract from considering the role of data revisions and real time data in this paper.
For a paper tackling these issues, see Orphanides (2001).
8hand. Section 4 takes the estimated rules seriously and performs the previously
discussed logical consistency check. Section 5 concludes.
2 Monetary policy: model and estimation strategy
We work with an extension of the original simple policy rule proposed by
Taylor (1993). Our model reads as follows







t =( 1− ρπ)π
LR + ρππ
∗





t + zt (2.3)
zt = φz(St)zt−1 +  
z
t (2.4)
where it is the short-term nominal interest rate, πt is the inﬂation rate, yt is the
output gap — ie the deviation of log-real GDP with respect to its long-run trend,
r is the long-run real interest rate, π∗
t is the possibly time-varying inﬂation
target, zt is the inﬂation gap, and St is a random variable whose realization is
interpreted as the state in which the economy (most likely) is at time t.
Model (2.1)—(2.4) relaxes the original Taylor rule model along diﬀerent
dimensions. First, we allow — but do not necessarily require — the policy
parameters to be state dependent. In particular, in the light of the instability
of the US monetary policy conduct documented by several recent empirical
investigations — Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004), Cogley and Sargent (2005a), Kim and Nelson (2006),Boivin (2006),
Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Benati and Surico (2008a) — we enhance
policy parameters α, β,a n dρ to switch across states, so to capture possible
changes in the monetary policy conduct occurred in the post-WWII US
economic history. Moreover, several authors — Schorfheide (2005), Justiniano
and Primiceri (2008), Mojon (2007), and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2008)
— have provided evidence in favor of heteroskedasticity of the US monetary
policy shocks. To account for it, we allow the variance of the monetary policy
shock  MP
t to be state dependent, ie  MP
t ∼ N(0,σ 2
 MP(St)).
As said, trend inﬂation is possibly an important ingredient in a Taylor
rule set up. We assume the time-varying inﬂation target to follow the
autoregressive process (2.2) whose persistence is driven by the parameter ρπ
and whose unconditional mean reads πLR. We interpret π∗
t as the short-term
goal that the Fed sets period by period conditional to the economic situation
and its knowledge of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Cogley
9and Sargent (2005b), Primiceri (2006), Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006),
and Carboni and Ellison (2008) show that the Fed is likely to have learnt
the structure of the economy over time and, consequently, to have revised
its estimates of the disinﬂationary costs associated to a monetary policy
tightening. It may very well be that the Fed has set the short run inﬂation
target π∗
t by considering the perceived inﬂation-output volatility trade-oﬀ.B y
contrast, the long-run inﬂation target πLR is meant to be compatible with
long-run goals such as sustainable growth and employment. Following other
authors — Ireland (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2005), Cogley and Sbordone
(2007), Bjørnland, Leitemo, and Maih (2007), Stock and Watson (2007), Leigh
(2008) and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2008) — we do not propose a
microfounded model for the inﬂa t i o nt a r g e t ,w h i c hi st h e na s s u m e dt oe v o l v e
exogenously.5 Both the short-run inﬂation target and its long-run counterpart
are state-independent.6
We assume that the Fed aims to close the short-run inﬂation gap (2.3) by
manipulating the real interest rate gap rt − r,w h e r ert ≡ it − πt.L i k e l y ,t h e
monetary policy impulse takes some time before inﬂuencing inﬂation due to
the frictional adjustments in consumption and investment decisions as well as
price stickiness. Then, as suggested by eq (2.4), we allow zt to be serially
correlated. Importantly, the degree of inﬂation gap persistence φz is assumed
to be state-dependent. Cogley and Sbordone (2007), Cogley, Primiceri, and
Sargent (2008), and Benati and Surico (2008a) show that the inﬂation gap
persistence is likely to have changed when moving from the ’70s to the Great
Moderation subsample. In the long-run, inﬂation and output gaps close
and the stochastic elements of the model assume their unconditional mean.
Consequently, πt = π∗
t = πLR and it = i = r + πLR, which is the Fisher
equation consistent with our Taylor rule.
We model shocks to the policy target and to the inﬂation gap process
throughout the stochastic components  π∗
t ∼ N(0,σ2
 π∗) and  z
t ∼ N(0,σ 2
 z).7
T h e s ee r r o rt e r m s ,a sw e l la st h ep o l i c ys h o c k MP
t , are assumed to be mutually
uncorrelated independently distributed martingale diﬀerences.8
5Ireland (2007) tests the role of exogenous supply shocks in shaping such a target, but
ﬁnds their role to be negligible.
6Schorfheide (2005) estimates a small scale macroeconomic model that allows for
the inﬂation target and the variance of the monetary policy shock to switch between
two states, and ﬁnds evidence for shifts of the inﬂation target and monetary policy
shock heteroskedasticy in the post-WWII sample. Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2007)
embeds Schorfheide (2005)’s inﬂation target process in a medium scale model featuring
heteroskedastic macroeconomic shocks. Their preliminary results support a constant
inﬂation target over the same period investigated by Schorfheide (2005). While we do
not admit abrupt shifts in our inﬂation target, we allow for quarter-by-quarter variations
as in Ireland (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2005), Cogley and Sbordone (2007), Bjørnland,
Leitemo, and Maih (2007), and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2008).
7We assume the shocks to the inﬂation target to be homoskedastic. For contributions
relaxing this assumption, see Schorfheide (2005), Stock and Watson (2007), and Cogley,
Primiceri, and Sargent (2008).
8Notice that our formulation embeds a stochastic intercept. As pointed out by Cochrane
(2007), if we estimated the model with a deterministic intercept, we would induce serial
correlation in the — reduced form, at that point — Taylor rule residual. This can be seen by
rewriting the rule as follows: it =[ 1− ρ(St)][r + e α(St)πt + β(St)yt]+ρ(St)it−1 + ηt,
where ηt ≡  MP
t − α(St)π∗
t is clearly a serially correlated process in the light of eq (2.2).
10Estimated policy rules and econometric strategy
We ﬁt three diﬀerent Taylor rules to US quarterly data spanning the sample
1955Q1—2007Q2.9 We focus on the following models:
1. EFT:Ar u l ew i t hﬁxed long-run inﬂation target, ie model (2.1)—(2.4)
estimated under the constraints φz = ρπ = σa = ση =0 ;
2. HPT: The model (2.1)—(2.4), with the latent series of the inﬂation target
π∗
t computed as the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter of the GDP deﬂator inﬂation
series (smoothing weight: 1,600);
3. ETVT The model (2.1)—(2.4), in which the latent series of the inﬂation
is assumed to be an autoregressive process.
To estimate our policy rules, we assume the existence of two states — labeled
as 0 and 1. These two states are modeled via the random variable St = {0,1},




1 − p01 p10
p01 1 − p10
¸
where pij = Pr(St = j|St−1 = i) is the probability of moving from state i —
the relevant state at time t−1 —t os t a t ej at time t,a n d
P
i pij =1 .D e ﬁning
e St ≡ [Pr(St =0 ) ,Pr(St =1 ) ] 0, the evolution of the states is then dictated by
the law of motion Ete St+1 = P e St.
We estimate the model with Bayesian techniques by implementing an
eﬃcient Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) strategy through the Gibbs
sampler. MCMC algorithms for regime-switching ARMA models have been
introduced by Albert and Chip (1993), McCulloch and Tsay (1993), and
successively developed by Billio, Monfort, and Robert (1999). In this
framework we generalize their approach to include the extra non-observable
component, ie the time-varying inﬂation target. Furthermore, we use a
multi-move version of the Gibbs sampler in which we sample the states
S = (S1,...,S T) from their joint distribution to improve the eﬃciency of
the algorithm.10
As shown by Albert and Chib (1993), McCulloch and Tsay (1993), and
Billio, Monfort, and Robert (1999), the imposition of constraints on the
parameter space enhances the identiﬁcation of the estimated regimes and
model parameters. We then impose two constraints. The ﬁrst one regards
the reactiveness of the Fed to ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation gap. The monetary
9The data source is the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ website. We retrieved the
short-term policy rate (eﬀective federal funds rate), the real GDP level Yt, the estimate of
the potential output made by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce Y ∗
t , and the GDP deﬂator
Pt. Quarterly observations of the federal funds rate were obtained by averaging monthly
observations. The output gap is the percentualized log-deviation of the real GDP from its
potential level, ie yt ≡ 100log(Yt/Y ∗
t ).T h ei n ﬂation rate is the annualized quarterly growth
rate of the GDP deﬂator, ie πt ≡ 400log(Pt/Pt−1). Our dataset is available upon request.
10A detailed explanation of our estimation strategy is provided in the Appendix.
11policy literature has widely accepted the ‘Taylor principle’, ie the prescription
for monetary authorities to react with the policy rate more than one-to-one to
ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation rate to move in the right direction the real interest
rate and aggregate demand so to return inﬂation to its target (Woodford,
2003). As in the original Taylor (1993) rule, eq (2.1) has a built-in one-to-one
reaction to inﬂation in the ‘Fisher equation part’ of the rule. Consequently,
we label a rule as ‘active’ when the real interest rate is raised at a level
higher than its natural counterpart, ie when α > 0. Accordingly, we assume
α(St =0 )> 0 >α (St =1 )and interpret St =0as the state identifying
‘active’ monetary policy.11
The second constraint regards state-contingent monetary policy shock
volatility σ2
 MP(St). Mojon (2007) empirically veriﬁes that changes in the
magnitude of the monetary policy shocks are important for explaining the
evolution of the US real GDP volatility. The relationship between more
conservative monetary policies and lower monetary policy shocks has also been
found by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent
(2008). Accordingly, we assume σ2
 MP(St =0 )<σ 2
 MP(St =1 ) .
To reiterate, we do not impose any date-break a priori, ie parameter
instability, if present, will be endogenously suggested by our estimation
strategy.
Trend inﬂation and the Taylor principle: a caveat
The fact of allowing for a positive inﬂation target is not innocuous for the
identiﬁcation of the determinacy conditions. Ascari and Ropele (2007b) show
that, in a new-Keynesian model derived consistently with a strictly positive
steady state inﬂation rate, the standard Taylor principle does not hold true
anymore. This is so because in presence of trend inﬂation the aggregate
price index displays an upward trend. Then, ﬁrms able to reoptimize i) set
higher prices and ii) assign a larger weight on expected — relative to current
— realizations of the business cycle to avoid the erosion of relative prices and
real proﬁts. This ﬂattens the Phillips curve and induces an increase in the
sacriﬁce ratio. Consequently, a widening of the indeterminacy territory occurs.
11It is straightforward to rewrite the Taylor rule (2.1) in the following — somewhat more
conventional — version: it =[ 1− ρ(St)][γ(St)+e α(St)πt + β(St)yt]+ρ(St)it−1+ MP
t ,w h e r e
γ(St) ≡ r − α(St)π∗
t, e α(St) ≡ 1+α(St). When conditioning to a single state, Woodford
(2003) shows that the systematic monetary policy reaction to inﬂa t i o nr e q u i r e dt op i nd o w n
a unique equilibrium in a new-Keynesian framework — ie the ‘Taylor principle’ — is e α(St) >
1−(1−δ)β(St)/κ,w h e r eδ if ﬁrms’ discount factor and κ is the slope of the Phillips curve.
Notably, if policymakers’ reaction to business cycle ﬂuctuations β(St) > 0,av a l u eo fe α(St)
lower than one — a value of α(St) lower than zero — can still be consistent with a unique
equilibrium. Therefore, the set of constraints we impose to identify the states might induce
an overestimation of the ‘passive’ monetary policy phases. We performed an ex-post check
based on our estimated α(St)s and β(St)s and conditional to δ =0 .99 and κ =0 .1 (a
calibration widely adopted in the literature), and we veriﬁed that such overestimation does
not occur, ie the ‘passive’ states we obtain remain unchanged when considering Woodford
(2003)’s uniqueness condition.
12In other words, under trend inﬂation a ‘modiﬁed Taylor principle’ applies.12
Obviously, this may not be consistent with the ‘active’/‘passive’ monetary
policy interpretation of our two estimated states, ie we may label as ‘active’ a
policy that, in Ascari and Ropele (2007b)’s world, delivers multiple equilibria.
Ropele (2007) shows that under full price indexation the ‘standard’ Taylor
principle is restored. The literature has oﬀered a variety of point estimates
for the indexation parameter, ranging from zero (Cogley and Sbordone, 2005;
Cogley and Sbordone, 2007) to values close to one (Giannoni and Woodford,
2003). We leave the estimation of a regime-switching framework conditional
on the modiﬁed Taylor principle as in Ascari and Ropele (2007b) to future
research.
3 Empirical evidence
As already pointed out, there are several dimensions along which we want to
compare our three estimated models. First, we aim to check if the data support
parameter instability and trend inﬂa t i o ni no u rf r a m e w o r k .G i v e nt h ea l r e a d y
mentioned contributions ﬁnding evidence in favor of these objects, we see this
check as a sort of validation exercise for our estimations. Second, we want
to understand if possibly misspeciﬁed models such as the ﬁxed-inﬂation target
model (EFT) and the model approximating trend inﬂation with the HP-ﬁltered
inﬂation rate (HPT) feature diﬀerent posterior estimates with respect to our
most ﬂexible model (ETVT), which shapes trend inﬂation with a stochastic
autoregressive process. A related point regards the estimated states St and the
timing of the switches from a state to another. Finally, we are also willing to
check the ‘internal consistency’ of our estimated Taylor rules in the light of the
reasoning proposed in the Introduction, ie estimated Taylor rules should deliver
a negative relationship between measures the estimated monetary policy stance
and the inﬂation gap (more on this point in the next Section).
Inﬂation targets
Figure 1 displays the US inﬂation rate along with the three diﬀerent estimated
inﬂation targets in the post-WWII period. The simplest rule we estimate, ie
the EFT rule, suggests an ﬁxed policy target — median value — equal to 1.06.13
Not surprisingly, the HP ﬁltered inﬂation rate smoothly follows the tendential
path of observed inﬂation over the sample. Interestingly, also the estimated
target under the ETVT rule follows fairly closely the evolution of the inﬂation
rate, and it displays a much lower degree of smoothness with respect to the
12Ascari and Ropele (2007b) show that this ‘modiﬁed Taylor principle’ calls for a more
aggressive response to inﬂation ﬂuctuations by monetary policy authorities to induce
equilibrium uniqueness. The presence of interest rate smoothing in the policy rule suggests
a more moderate reaction to business cycle ﬂuctuations.
13This value is somewhat lower with respect to others proposed in the literature. All
results concerning the EFT model are robust to the employment of a ﬁxed target set to the
inﬂation sample mean, ie 3.58%.N o t i c et h a tr and πLR are identiﬁed also in the EFT rule
due to the state dependence of the parameter α.
13HP ﬁlter trend, so suggesting a non-negligible role played by shocks to the
inﬂation target for the inﬂation trend path. Eyeball econometrics suggests
that our estimated ETVT inﬂation target is very close to the one proposed in
a DSGE context by Ireland (2007), appears to belong to the new-Keynesian
Phillips curve-based credible set estimated by Cogley and Sbordone (2007),
and it is in line with the latent factor identiﬁed by Cogley, Primiceri, and
Sargent (2008).
Obviously, our three diﬀerent Taylor rules imply strikingly diﬀerent
inﬂation gaps πt − π∗
t.14 In particular, the ETVT inﬂation gap is much less
volatile than the HPT inﬂation gap, ie the sample standard deviation of the
former is 0.74 vs the latter’s 1.16. Moreover, the width of the swings is also
quite rule-speciﬁc. For instance, the HP inﬂation gap suggests that the Fed
m a yh a v el e tt h ei n ﬂa t i o ng a pr e c o r dav a l u ee q u a lt o4 . 8 %i n1 9 7 4 Q 4i nt h e
aftermath of the ﬁrst oil shock, while the ETVT model consistent gap assigns
2.95% to the same quarter, values much lower than the one associated to the
ﬁxed-target EFT model, which associate to that quarter an inﬂation gap equal
to 9.72%!
Regime shifts
Given the evidence presented in Figure 1, one should probably expect to ﬁnd
diﬀerences in the estimated regimes as well as parameters across policy rules.
In fact, it turns out that this is not the case. Figure 2 plots the estimated
probabilities p(St =1 )of being in the ‘passive’ monetary policy state. The
three diﬀerent models deliver a very similar picture in terms of estimated
regimes. The medians of the estimated probabilities associated to the two
models that allow for a time-varying inﬂation target indicate more clearly
the estimated state of the economy. However, apart from a single episode
associated to the EFT model, the remaining switches and estimated regimes
are very similar across models, as also testiﬁe db yT a b l e1 .O nt h eo n eh a n d ,
one may interpret this ﬁnding as good news — a misspeciﬁed Taylor rule does
not necessarily lead to any evident econometric bias in terms of estimated
regimes. On the other hand, this result may be driven by identiﬁcation
problems aﬀecting inference over the parameters of our monetary policy rules,
an issue recently re-proposed by Canova and Sala (2006), Cochrane (2007),
Beyer and Farmer (2007), and Lubik and Schorfheide (2007).
With this warning in mind, we notice that our estimated regime-switches
support just in ﬁrst approximation the single-regime shift at the end of the
’70s often imposed when studying the US monetary policy. In fact, the period
1976—1979 falls under the active monetary policy regime. This might be due to
some positive realizations of the real interest rate change in the mid-’70s as well
as to the reduction in the monetary policy volatility possibly occurred in those
years (Mojon, 2007).15 By the same token, the switch to a passive monetary
14The Figure comparing our model-speciﬁci n ﬂation gaps is not shown in the paper but
it is available upon request.
15Notably, Sims and Zha (2006) and Mojon (2007) ﬁnd that the best ﬁtting model is a
model displaying no changes in the policy rule coeﬃcients and heteroskedastic policy shocks,
but they cannot reject models with unstable policy rule on the basis of marginal likelihood
comparisons.
14policy regime detected for the year 2001 may be due to deviations with respect
the systematic policy stance predicted by a standard Taylor rule due to the
stock market bust taking place at the beginning of the new Millennium, a
ﬁnding corroborated by Benati and Surico (2008a)’s estimates.16
As regards the ’80s, we ﬁnd a switch towards active monetary policy in
1985Q1 (ETVT model). This break date comes somewhat later with respect
to the end of the ‘Volcker experiment’, but it is close to the usual dating of the
Great Moderation (McConnel and Perez-Quiros, 2000) and the break-down
in the ability of a variety of models to predict US inﬂation and output
(D’Agostino, Giannone, and Surico, 2006; and Giannone, Reichlin, and Lenza,
2008).17
Posterior estimates
We now turn to the analysis of our posterior estimates. Table 2 reports
the median values — along with the [5th,95th] percentiles — of our policy
rules. The model of highest interest for us is ETVT. Interestingly, all
the parameters featuring the inﬂation target process assume non-zero values.
The credible set of ρπ suggests a very persistent process for the estimated
inﬂation target, with the posterior median reading 0.97,s os u g g e s t i n ga n
almost random walk-like behavior of the inﬂation target, in line with Ireland
(2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2005), Cogley and Sbordone (2007), Bjørnland,
Leitemo, and Maih (2007), Stock and Watson (2007), and Cogley, Primiceri,
and Sargent (2008). Interestingly, the estimated persistence of the inﬂation
gap — captured by the parameter φz(St) — drops when shifting from passive to
active monetary policy, moving from a median of 0.41 down to 0.06. While
being somewhat lower with respect to some estimates recently put forward by
Cogley and Sbordone (2007) and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2008), these
ﬁgures are similar to the inﬂation gap’s normalized spectrum at frequency zero
(median values) proposed by Benati and Surico (2008a). The three previously
mentioned contributions, as well as this paper, all point towards the same
direction, ie a lower persistence of the inﬂation gap in the Great Moderation
sample.
To further investigate this issue, we construct the distribution of the
diﬀerence ∆φz = φz(St =0 )− φz(St =1 )by sampling 25,000 times from
φz(St =0 )and φz(St =1 )and computing the diﬀerence for each pair of
draws. A reduction in the inﬂation gap persistence when moving from the
passive to the active state would be associated to a large mass of the density
∆φz located on the left of the zero vertical line. Figure 3 depicts the so
16In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack, the Fed implemented the largest repurchase
aggreement ever realized, ie $81.25 billion on September 14 (Cecchetti, 2007).
17Boivin and Giannoni (2006) estimate the 90% conﬁdence interval for the break date
in a VAR suited to perform monetary policy analysis to range from 1977Q1 to 1986Q2.
Admittedly, the ‘Volcker experiment’ 1979—1982 period may hardly be captured by a Taylor
rule tracking a short-term nominal interest rate. It may well be that such subsample is
aﬀecting the estimated duration of the passive monetary policy regime. One could tackle
this issue by estimating a model with three diﬀerent regimes, so to possibly account for the
Volcker experiment. Favero and Monacelli (2005) decide against this option due to high
instability/sensitivity to initial conditions of the estimated parameters/regimes.
15constructed density. Indeed, the density is dominated by negative realizations.
Even if the 95th percentile reads 0.09,s os u g g e s t i n gt h a tt h e90% coverage
contains the zero value, the 84th percentile — which can be related to the
68% coverage — is −0.02, a value suggesting a signiﬁcant fall in the inﬂation
gap persistence. Negative realizations when moving from the ‘passive’ to the
‘active’ state amount to 87%, which falls to 64% when requiring a 0.2 gap when
sampling from the ∆φz distribution. While not oﬀering decisive evidence in
favor of a drop in the inﬂation gap variable when entering the last 20 years
of our sample, our results tend to favor this view.18 Moreover, our estimated
regimes suggest a negative correlation between monetary policy aggressiveness
and the inﬂation gap persistence, a ﬁnding in line with Benati and Surico
(2008a).
Table 3 collects further statistics regarding the posterior density of the
diﬀerence in the inﬂation gap persistence. As already noted by Cogley,
Primiceri, and Sargent (2008), the assumption of uncorrelated inﬂation gap
proposed by Stock and Watson (2007) is hardly supported by the data.
When computing the joint probability of having realizations of the inﬂation
persistence parameter close to zero in both states, we obtained a sample
Pr(φz(St =0 )<k∩ φz(St =1 )<k ) equal to 3.30% for k =0 .05 and to
10.38% for k =0 .10,c e r t a i n l yn o tal a r g es u p p o r tf o rt h e‘ w h i t en o i s ei n ﬂation
gap’ hypothesis.
Estimated Taylor rules: anything goes?
Going back to our posterior estimates, there are no striking diﬀerences across
models in terms of estimated parameters.19 The median of the two models
admitting time-variation in the inﬂation target returns more conventional
values of the long run inﬂation target. The steady-state real interest rate
assumes values in line with most of the estimates in the literature, and the
same holds as regards the Taylor rule parameters. In particular, we notice the
‘robustness’ of the estimated Taylor principle parameter α as opposed to the
wide diﬀerence observed in the inﬂation gaps across scenarios.
To wrap up, our estimated inﬂation targets are clearly diﬀerent across
models. However, the consequently diﬀerent inﬂation gaps appear to be
important neither for the estimation of the policy regimes nor for that of the
Taylor rule parameters. Unfortunately, the federal funds rate is very persistent,
and measures of ﬁt associated to whatever policy rule admitting interest rate
smoothing are likely not to be powerful objects to distinguish between more or
18Adding some structure to our framework could strengthen the evidence in favor of a fall
in the inﬂation gap persistence. On this point, see Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2008).
19This is conﬁrmed by looking at the posterior distributions of the diﬀerences between a
given model and the ETVT model. We constructed such posteriors by i) randomly drawing
a value out of the empirical posterior of a given parameter of the model ETVT, ii) randomly
drawing a value out of the empirical posterior of the same parameter of an alternative model,
iii) taking the diﬀerence between the two drawn values, iv) repeating the same exercise
25,000 times for the same parameter, and v) performing steps i)—iv) for all the parameters
in common between the ETVT model and the alternative model. We veriﬁed that the zero
value belongs to the [5th,9th] coverage of all the so constructed posterior distributions.
16less interesting models.20 There, should we conclude that all these Taylor rules
are all alike? Are stochastic models of trend inﬂation superﬂuous in the Taylor
rule framework? To answer these questions, we develop in the next Section an
‘internal consistency’ test.
4 Estimated Taylor rules: an internal consistency test
To discriminate among our estimated policy rules, we propose the following
test. In a Taylor-rule world, one should expect a two—way causality between
the inﬂation gap πt − π∗
t and the real interest rate gap rt − r to be present.
The ﬁrst causality link runs from the inﬂation gap to the real interest rate
gap, and it is captured by the Taylor rule itself. Such rule suggests that
positive (negative) inﬂationary pressures should be tackled by tight (loose)
monetary policies (Taylor, 1993). This is so because of the following ‘reverse
causality’ argument. An increase in the real interest rate gap negatively aﬀects
aggregate demand by inducing households to postpone their consumption and
entrepreneurs to reduce investments in productive activities. In turn, the
reduction in aggregate demand triggers a downward pressure on prices, which
will eventually lead inﬂation to go back to its target level. Therefore, when
scrutinizing the causality running from the (Taylor-rule consistent) real interest
rate gap to the inﬂation gap, one should ﬁnd it negative and signiﬁcant.21
What if such negative correlation does not emerge? We believe there are two
(not necessarily rival) explanations. One refers to the misspeciﬁcation of the
simple rules at hand. If our estimated rules do not oﬀer a good representation of
policymakers’ behavior, then our internal consistency test focuses on the wrong
object and cannot provide us with any interesting information. The other
explanation regards passive monetary policy/indeterminacy. Under the passive
monetary policy scenario, monetary pol i c yd o e sn o tp i nd o w np r i v a t es e c t o r ’ s
inﬂation expectations and inﬂation, then a very weak relationship between the
monetary policy gaps — if any — is likely to emerge. The assumption of a
negative correlation between the real interest rate gap and the inﬂation gap is
testable. In this Section we precisely aim to test this assumption.
First-glance information may be obtained by focusing on scatter-plots.
Figures 4—6 plots inﬂation gaps vs real interest rate gaps for the three analyzed
models. We look both at the full sample (empty circles) and at the longest
‘active’ monetary policy subsample (ﬁlled circles), ie the Great Moderation
sample. To focus on ‘reverse causality’ — the monetary policy transmission
channel — as opposed to Taylor rule channel, we lag the real interest rate gap
by four periods. In this way we possibly account for delays in the transmission
of monetary policy impulses and circumvent the otherwise present endogeneity.
Figure 4 refers to the Estimated Fixed Target model. Several considerations
20On top of that, the HPT model was estimated with a set of data including on more
‘observable’, ie HP-ﬁltered inﬂation. Consequently, a model comparison based on marginal
likelihoods would not be proper.
21Reynard (2007) puts forward this argument and proposes a graphical analysis involving
the interest rate and inﬂation gap without performing any formal econometric test. By
contrast, in this Section we take the ‘internal consistency’ hypothesis to the data.
17are in order. The dispersion related to the full sample is considerable. The
regression line has an evident negative slope, but the ‘uncertainty’ surrounding
such slope is huge. This is not surprising in the light of the large inﬂation
s w i n g so c c u r r e di nt h e’ 7 0 sw h i c hd on o tg om u c hh a n d - i n - h a n dw i t ht h ei d e a
of a constant inﬂation target. The Great Moderation subsample oﬀers a much
less dispersed scatter-plot. However, the regression line displays a somewhat
puzzling positive slope (not signiﬁcant, though).22 Seemingly, the relationships
between the monetary policy gaps conditional to the ﬁxed-target Taylor rule
does not pass our ‘internal consistency’ test, above all when the last 20 years
are considered.
The scatter plots associated to the Hodrick-Prescott Target model — Figure
5—d e p i c t sad i ﬀerent situation. Evidently, there is much less dispersion with
respect to the EFT case. Moreover, a much clearer relationship emerges when
moving to the Great Moderation sample. As said, if monetary policy becomes
more aggressive, the link between monetary policy actions and the inﬂation
gap should become tighter, exactly what the scatter plot suggests. Then, from
a qualitative perspective, the HP ﬁlter produces a time-varying inﬂation target
that leads the HPT model to meet our requirements.
It is comforting to notice that one may tell the same story as regards
the Estimated Time-Varying Target model. Figure 6 shows that the model
with the stochastic inﬂation trend delivers a scatter plot with even much less
dispersion than in the HPT case, and with a regression line also assuming a
negative value when conditioning on the Great Moderation subsample.
While this preliminary overview is probably enough to cast doubts on
the goodness of the ﬁxed-target model, one is left to wonder if the eﬀort of
estimating policy rules with stochastic time-varying targets brings to higher
returns with respect to the quick-ﬁx solution of the HP time-varying trend
inﬂation. To answer this question, Table 4 collects the estimates of the above
commented regression line, ie
πt − π
∗
t = c + ξ(rt−i − r)+ζt (4.1)
with i =4 .
As already stressed, to pass the ‘internal consistency’ test we require a
model to deliver a negative value of the slope parameter ξ.O nt o po fi t ,g i v e n
that in the long run all gaps should close, to pass the test a model should also
be associated to a zero value for the constant c.
Table 4 provides additional informa t i o no nt h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e n
the model-speciﬁc monetary policy gaps. First, when the full sample
1955Q1—2007Q2 is considered, none of the models appears to be satisfactory.
This may be due to bad measurement of either/both gaps, or to the peculiarity
of the employed sample. Indeed, our test implicitly assumes a suﬃciently
22This positive slope might be the due to endogeneity. We show later that this result is
robust to the employment of a real interest rate gap lagged eight periods.
18aggressive monetary policy.23 According to several contributions in
theliterature as well as our own estimates, passive monetary policy has
appeared in several subsamples in the post WWII time span. We then
repeat our exercise by conditioning ﬁrst to 1985Q1—2007Q2, so to consider
the previously estimated monetary policy shift. Finally, we estimate eq (4.1)
for the sample 1985Q2—2000Q4 so to control for the 2001 year for which we
found evidence supporting passive monetary policy.24
Interestingly, the regression outcome allows us to discriminate between the
two time-varying inﬂation target scenarios. Indeed, the HP-based inﬂation gap
does never pass our ‘internal consistency’ test. The robustness check run by
trimming the sample in 2000Q4 corroborates our ﬁndings. By contrast, the
ETVT model passes the test, with a negative relationship between the gaps of
interest equal to −0.051 and signiﬁcant when considering the 95% conﬁdence
interval.
As already pointed out, if the Fed reacts to expected inﬂation as opposed
to current inﬂation, then some endogeneity issue may arise. Eg Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (2000) estimate forward looking Taylor rules by allowing for a
time-horizon of one year. In the attempt of escaping the endogeneity trap,
we also perform an exercise with i =8 . Table 5 proposes our exercise with
eight lags. With such a transmission lag, the ETVT model is supported in
all the investigated samples. We also notice that the HPT framework gets
more support from the data than in the benchmark scenario. By contrast,
the EFT set up still fails to satisfy our requirements for a monetary policy
transmission consistent Taylor rule, with the constant being signiﬁcant in all
the scenarios at hand and the slope assuming a positive value in the Great
Moderation subsample.
Robustness check




t = c + ξ(rt−i − r)+δ(πt−1 − π
∗
t−1)+κyt−1 + ηt (4.2)
We ﬁr s tc h e c k e dt h ec a s ew i t hi =4 . With respect to the previous battery of
estimates, we found that the EFT model assumes a negative and signiﬁcant
slope — ie −0.052∗ — in the 1985Q1—2007Q2 sample. However, the constant
23Davig and Leeper (2007) show that, if rational agents consider a non-degenerate
probability distribution over the possible future regimes, then a ‘generalized Taylor
principle’ arises. The Davig-Leeper ‘generalized Taylor principle’ states that, in a linearized
version of the non-linear Markov-switching new-Keynesian model at hand, one may ﬁnd
parameterizations that allows for departures from the (short-run) Taylor principle but still
deliver a unique equilibrium as long as such departures are brief and/or quantitatively
modest. Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2008) elaborate on this point and show that
there exist parameterizations that meet Davig-Leeper generalized Taylor principle and
ensure uniqueness in Davig-Leeper’s linearized model but induce multiple equilibria in the
non-linear, original framework.
24We performed OLS estimations with the Newey-West covariance matrix estimator (3
lags) to account for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the estimated residuals.
19still takes a positive and very signiﬁcant value, then leading us to reject the
model. By contrast, the HPT model displays a signiﬁcant slope both in the
Great Moderation sample — −0.083∗∗∗ — and in the shorter post-’85 sample
— −0.099∗∗∗. Joint to the fact that the constant never displays signiﬁcance,
this result supports the HP trend as a proxy for trend inﬂation. The check
regarding the ETVT model corroborates the previously shown results. We also
veriﬁed the robustness of our ﬁndings with i =8 . All the results displayed in
Table 5 are robust to the additional regressors as in eq (4.2).
To summarize, our models with a time-varying inﬂation target turn out to
be superior with respect to the one with a ﬁxed target. The HP ﬁlter appears to
be a candidate to proxy the evolution of trend inﬂation, but the most robustly
supported model is the one with the stochastic autoregressive inﬂation trend.
Importantly, our result emerges more clearly when conditioning to the Great
Moderation subsample.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper estimates regime-switching Taylor rules with trend inﬂation for
the post-WWII U.S. economy. Our main conclusions read as follows. First,
we support regime switches and a time-varying inﬂation target as two features
of the US monetary policy conduct over the last 50 years. While there is
not striking evidence in favor of distortions in the estimated policy regimes as
well as policy parameters when considering diﬀerent models for trend inﬂation,
policy rules need to have a time-varying representation of the inﬂation target
to pass the ‘internal consistency’ test adopted in this paper and deliver a
statistically signiﬁcant and economically meaningful relationship between the
real interest rate gap and the inﬂation gap. Importantly, this relationship
clearly emerges when conditioning on the Great Moderation subsample, a
ﬁnding suggesting the presence of a monetary policy break in the ’80s.
Our estimations do not allow us to make a strong case against
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered inﬂation as empirical proxy of the time-varying
inﬂation target, but point towards the use of the stochastic autoregressive
representations as those employed by Ireland (2007), Cogley and Sbordone
(2005), Cogley and Sbordone (2007), Bjørnland, Leitemo, and Maih (2007),
Stock and Watson (2007), Leigh (2008) and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent
(2008). As in Cogley and Sbordone (2005), Cogley and Sbordone (2007),
and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2008), we ﬁn dad r o pi nt h ei n ﬂation
gap persistence when entering the Great Moderation sample. Possibly, this
persistence drop is driven by the shift towards a more aggressive monetary
policy, a correlation already pointed out by Benati and Surico (2008a).
Our conclusions strongly suggest to allow for time-varying inﬂation target
in the representation of the US policy conduct via simple rules. Our model for
the inﬂation target is mainly statistical. It would be interesting to understand
why the inﬂation target evolved over time. Possibly, imperfect knowledge of
the economic structure and the evolution of the perceived inﬂation-output
volatility trade-oﬀ by the Fed is one of the candidate explanation to interpret
20our results. Interesting eﬀorts in this direction have already been undertaken
by Cogley and Sargent (2005b), Primiceri (2006), Sargent, Williams, and
Zha (2006), and Carboni and Ellison (2008). Once established that the
time-varying inﬂation target is an important ingredient to describe the US
inﬂation rise and fall in the post-WWII sample, the switch from the positive
to the normative standpoint appears to be warranted. How should monetary
policy be conducted in presence of trend inﬂation? This question regards a
still largely unexplored research territory. An interesting analysis tackling this
issue has recently been proposed by Ascari and Ropele (2007a).
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25Technical appendix
Estimation algorithm
The goal of the inferential procedure is to estimate parameters and latent
processes, that in the general model are switching regimes and time varying
targets. Since regimes and targets are not observed, they are treated as
missing data in an Markov Chain MonteCarlo (MCMC) setup where the
target distribution is π(S,π∗,θ|Y ). The vector S represents the regimes,
θ =
³
¯ r,ρi,α i,βi,σ 2
 MP
i ,πLR,ρ π,φ i,σ2
 π∗,σ2
 z,p 01,p 10
´
,i=0 ,1 is the set of
parameters, π∗ is the time varying target, and Y is the vector of observables,
ie, it,y t and πt, t =1 ,...,T.
All the unobserved quantities can be simulated individually through the
Gibbs sampler algorithm. This approach allows not to directly compute the
likelihood function, which is a highly multivariate integral. The basic idea
behind MCMC is to build a Markov chain transition kernel starting from some
initial state (θ
(0),S
(0),π∗(0)), with limiting invariant distribution equal to the
posterior distribution of the quantities of interest. Under suitable conditions
(Robert and Casella, 1999; chapters 6—7), we can build such a transition
kernel generating a Markov chain {θ
(n),S
(n),π∗(n)}N
n=1 whose elements (draws)
converge in distribution to the (target) posterior density p(θ,S,π∗|Y ).O n c e
convergence is achieved, we obtain a sample of serially dependent simulated
‘observations’ on the parameter vector θ (and on the latent processes involved),
which can be used to perform Monte Carlo inference. More precisely, estimates
of the latent factors are given by averaging over the realization of the chain,
ie ˆ π
∗
t = n−1 Pn
j=1 π
∗(j)




MCMC for switching regime ARMA models have been introduced by
Albert and Chib (1993), McCulloch and Tsay (1993) and successively
developed by Billio, Monfort, and Robert (1999). Here we extend their
framework by considering models with an extra-latent factor, namely the time
varying target π∗, and adapting the eﬃcient approach by Chib (1996) to
update the states S. In particular, we build up an eﬃcient algorithm based on
the multi-move Gibbs sampler proposed by Chib (1996) to update the states
St,t=1 ,...,T.W es i m u l a t e(S1,...,S T) in block from their joint distribution
given the data and the other parameters. As suggested by Shephard (1994)
and Carter and Kohn (1994) amongst other, this approach reduces the
autocorrelation between states and speeds up the convergence of the chain
to its invariant distribution. It is easy to show that the full conditional
distributions of the latent target π∗ are Gaussian. We also used conjugate
priors wherever possible. This choice allows to obtain standard conditional
posterior distributions from which we can draw by direct simulation.
It is easy to show that the full conditional distributions for
ρi,α i,βi,ρ π,φ i,i=0 ,1 are truncated Gaussian, ¯ r and πLR are Gaussian,
σ2
 MP
i ,i=0 ,1,σ 2
 π∗,a n dσ2
 z are Inverse Gamma, whereas p01 and p10 are Beta.
Since all these quantities can be sampled directly, each sub-move of the chain is
accepted. Furthermore, to identify the two states, we impose some constraints




1 .25 To simulate
truncated Gamma random variables we use the accept-reject method proposed
by Philippe (1997).
Our algorithms works as follows:
• Initialize the chain at (θ
(0),S
(0),π∗(0))





T ) in block from p(S|π∗ (n−1),θ
(n−1),Y ) as
s u g g e s t e db yC h i b( 1 9 9 6 ) ;
— Update π∗















where θ−i− are the ﬁrst (i-1) elements of θ and θ−i+ are the elements
form the (i+1)-th to the last.
We run this algorithm for 50,000 iterations with a burn-in of 25,000, which
in our experience is large enough to render the impact of initial conditions
insigniﬁcant. To account for the serial correlation of the draws, we estimated
the numerical standard error of the sample mean by using the approach
adopted by Kim, Shephard, and Chip (1998).
25For investigations concerning identiﬁcation issues related to the estimation of
regime-switching models, see Fruwirth-Schnatter (2001) and Geweke and Keane (2007).
27Tables
Table 1. Subsamples associated to passive monetary policy: model
comparison
Description of the diﬀerent models: See Figure 1.
EFT HPT ETVT
1958Q1 − 1958Q2 −−
1969Q2 − 1976Q11 9 6 9 Q3 − 1976Q1 1969Q2 − 1975Q2
1979Q3 − 1985Q11 9 7 9 Q4 − 1985Q1 1979Q3 − 1984Q4
2001Q1 − 2001Q42 0 0 1 Q3 − 2002Q1 2001Q1 − 2001Q4
28Table 2. Estimated monetary policy rules: ﬁxed vs time-varying short
run inﬂation target
Figures reported in the Table are medians of the estimated posterior
distributions; [5th, 95th] percentile in squared brackets. Beta priors for the
switching probabilities deﬁned by their shape parameters. Description of the
diﬀerent models: See Figure 1. Details on estimation procedure reported in
the text.







































































ρπ N(0.8,0.1) −− 0.97
[0.94,0.99]
φz(S0
t) N(0.5,1.0) −− 0.06
[0.01,0.22]
φz(S1
t) N(0.5,1.0) −− 0.41
[0.03,0.83]
σ2
 π∗ IG(2.5,0.75) −− 0.30
[0.17,0.50]
σ2














29Table 3. Diﬀerence inﬂation gap persistence density: probabilities
Further explanations on the statistics reported in the table are detailed in the
text.





84th 95th k =0 k =0 .05 k =0 .1 k =0 .2 k =0 .05 k =0 .10
−0.02 0.09 86.68% 80.49% 74.99% 64.05% 3.30% 10.38%
30Table 4. Inﬂation-real interest rate gaps: statistical relationships
Inﬂation gap regressed on a constant and the real interest rate gap (lagged
four periods).
Sample: 1985Q2—2007Q2. Estimation performed via OLS with Newey-West
HAC VCV matrix (lag truncation=3).
***/**/* stands for 99/95/90 per cent statistical signiﬁcance. Description of
the diﬀerent models: See Figure 1. Details on the computation of the gaps
reported in the text.
Sample Est.param. EFT HPT ETVT

















































31Table 5. Inﬂation-real interest rate gaps: statistical relationships
Inﬂation gap regressed on a constant and the real interest rate gap (lagged
eight periods).
Sample: 1985Q2—2007Q2. Estimation performed via OLS with Newey-West
HAC VCV matrix (lag truncation=3).
***/**/* stands for 99/95/90 per cent statistical signiﬁcance. Description of
the diﬀerent models: See Figure 1. Details on the computation of the gaps
reported in the text.
Sample Est.param. EFT HPT ETVT




















































Figure 1. Inﬂation rate and estimated targets.
EFT: estimated inﬂation target according to the ﬁxed-inﬂation target model.
HPT: HP-ﬁlter (weight: 1,600) of the inﬂation series. ETVT: time-varying
inﬂation target estimated with a stochastic autoregressive model. EFT


































































































33Figure 2. Estimated probability of being in the passive monetary
policy state: model comparison.
Description of the diﬀerent models: See Figure 1. Smoothed estimates of the



































































































34Figure 3. Estimated inﬂation gap persistence: diﬀerence across
regimes.
This distribution plots 25,000 realizations of ∆φz,j = φz,j(St =0 )− φz,j(St =
1),w h e r ej identiﬁes the jth draw. More details on the construction of this
density in the text.









35Figure 4. Real interest rate gap vs inﬂation gap: estimated ﬁxed
target model.
Scatter plots involving the real interest rate gap — lagged four periods — and the
inﬂation gap. Empty black circles, black line: full sample analysis. Filled blue
circles, blue line: great moderation subsample. Computation of the monetary
policy gaps detailed in the text.




























36Figure 5. Real interest rate gap vs inﬂation gap: Hodrick-Prescott
target model.
Scatter plots involving the real interest rate gap — lagged four periods — and the
inﬂation gap. Empty black circles, black line: full sample analysis. Filled blue
circles, blue line: great moderation subsample. Computation of the monetary
policy gaps detailed in the text.





























37Figure 6. Real interest rate gap vs inﬂation gap: estimated
time-varying target model.
Scatter plots involving the real interest rate gap — lagged four periods — and the
inﬂation gap. Empty black circles, black line: full sample analysis. Filled blue
circles, blue line: great moderation subsample. Computation of the monetary
policy gaps detailed in the text.
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